trustyourinbox

What is DMARC?

The 5-minute version. Skip the RFC.

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The one-sentence version

DMARC lets you ask mailbox providers (Gmail, Microsoft, Yahoo) how to handle mail that claims to be from your domain but fails aligned SPF and DKIM authentication: take no action under DMARC, treat it as suspicious, or reject it.

Why it matters

Anyone can put your domain in the From: address of an email. There's nothing inherent in SMTP that prevents it. Spammers, phishers, and "we accidentally CC'd legal" operations all rely on this. DMARC helps close the gap by publishing your handling preference: "if a message says it's from acme.com but neither SPF nor DKIM passes with alignment to that domain, here's how we ask you to handle it."

With DMARC at p=reject, you ask receivers to reject mail that fails those checks. A failure is not proof of forgery: legitimate mail can fail because of a setup error or forwarding. Receivers still apply their own filtering policies, and DMARC does not stop lookalike domains or display-name impersonation.

How it fits with SPF and DKIM

SPF and DKIM are the two existing authentication mechanisms. DMARC sits on top of both:

  • SPF says "these are the IP addresses allowed to send mail for my domain." The receiving mailbox provider checks the sending IP against your SPF record.
  • DKIM attaches a cryptographic signature to outgoing mail. The receiving mailbox provider verifies the signature against a public key you publish in DNS.
  • DMARC says "if neither SPF nor DKIM passes and aligns with my From: domain, here's what to do." Alignment is the part most people miss. SPF and DKIM can pass technically but for a different domain (e.g. your transactional ESP), which is why DMARC adds the alignment requirement.

You don't need to fully understand all three to get value from DMARC. Publishing a DMARC record at p=none is enough to start collecting reports, and the data those reports contain will tell you what your real mail flows look like.

What's in a DMARC record?

A DMARC record is a single TXT record at _dmarc.<your-domain>. It looks like this:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:reports@example.com

The interesting parts:

  • p=: the requested policy. none = take no action under DMARC. quarantine = treat failing mail as suspicious, often by sending it to spam. reject = reject failing mail. Receivers make the final delivery decision.
  • rua=: where to send aggregate reports. This is the address that gets a daily summary of what mailbox providers saw. (This is what we ingest at trustyourinbox.)
  • np=: the policy for subdomains that don't exist (a common spoofing target). np=reject is a safe addition even at p=none. This is new in DMARCbis; see what changed in DMARCbis.

You may also see an older pct= tag on existing records. It staged partial enforcement, but DMARCbis removed it. Modern records use the t=y test-mode flag to stage a rollout instead.

Why "monitor only" is a real first step

p=none asks receivers to take no action based on DMARC alone; their other spam and security checks still apply. With a rua= address, you also ask participating mailbox providers to send reports about what they saw. This is valuable on its own: within a few days you'll see exactly which IP ranges are sending mail in your name (your CRM, your transactional ESP, your billing platform, plus anything you didn't know about).

Once you've watched p=none for 4-8 weeks and know what "normal" looks like, you progress up the policy ladder: p=quarantine → p=reject, using the t=y test-mode flag to stage each step if you want a soft launch. The whole arc usually takes 2-3 months for a typical small business.

Common gotchas

Forgetting your transactional ESP. You publish DMARC, then ramp to p=reject, then everyone's password-reset emails start bouncing because your ESP's signing domain wasn't aligned. Fix: configure DKIM signing on your ESP with explicit aligned signatures (CNAME the DKIM keys onto a subdomain you control).

Subdomain leakage. If your p=reject is on acme.com but you don't set sp=, then marketing.acme.com inherits the policy by default. Sometimes that's fine. Sometimes it isn't. Set sp= explicitly for existing subdomains, and np=reject for ones that don't exist (the spoofing case DMARCbis added).

Mailing lists. If your CEO posts to a mailing list, the list relays the message but rewrites the headers. SPF passes for the list's server, but DKIM signature breaks because the list edits the body. The forwarded copy fails DMARC at p=reject. There's no perfect fix; ARC helps, and most modern lists rewrite the From: header so the message authenticates as the list instead.

See what a stricter policy would have done to last month's mail.

Enforcement Preview replays your last 30 days of reports under quarantine or reject before you change DNS, and shows which mail would have failed. Included on every plan.

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